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“It was ‘the best thing we’ve ever had rammed down our 
throats.’”1 
 
       †  J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2012; B.A., Political 
Science, University of Minnesota, 2008. 
 1. Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recordings of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody 
Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1127 (2005) [hereinafter Everybody Wins] 
(quoting Telephone Interview with Alan K. Harris, Deputy Prosecutor, Hennepin 
1
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Alan Harris was referring to Minnesota’s landmark decision in 
State v. Scales that mandated electronic recording of custodial 
interrogations.2  At the time, Minnesota was only the second state to 
adopt a recording requirement.3  Since Scales, the practice has 
gained wide support in Minnesota and throughout the country.4  
Substantial law has developed around recording in the form of 
statutes, court rules, and special jury instructions.5  Yet questions 
remain as to the extent of the requirement’s application in 
Minnesota.  
Recently, in State v. Sanders, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
faced the question of whether the recording requirement applies 
to custodial interrogations conducted in another jurisdiction.6  
Sanders was interrogated by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
agents in Illinois, but, in accordance with FBI policy and Illinois 
law, the interrogation was not recorded.7  Evidence from this 
interrogation was ultimately admitted in trial, and Sanders was 
convicted of criminal sexual conduct.8  On appeal, Sanders argued 
in part that the unrecorded interrogation substantially violated 
Scales and should be suppressed.9  However, the supreme court 
disposed of the case without resolving whether Scales applies to 
interrogations conducted outside Minnesota.10  
This note first examines the history of mandatory recording of 
custodial interrogations and its expansion throughout the 
country.11  It then details the facts and procedural history of 
Sanders, concentrating on the supreme court’s holding,12 followed 
 
County Attorney’s Office (Feb. 8, 2005)). 
 2. Id. (citing State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994)). 
 3. See Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 591. 
 4. In its recommendation that law enforcement agencies videotape 
interrogations, the American Bar Association (ABA) pointed out that “[a]n ever-
increasing number of jurisdictions record interrogations.”  ABA RESOLUTION 5 
(Feb. 9, 2004), available at http://www.nacdl.org/sl_docs.nsf/freeform
/MERI_attachments/$FILE/MERI_ABA0409.pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 47. 
 6. 775 N.W.2d 883, 866 (Minn. 2009). 
 7. Id. at 885. 
 8. Id. at 886. 
 9. Id. at 887. 
 10. Id. at 889. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
2
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by an analysis of the decision.13  Finally, the note concludes by 
asserting that the Minnesota Supreme Court should have adopted 
an exception to Scales for out-of-state interrogations conducted 
without the involvement of Minnesota law enforcement agencies.14 
II. HISTORY  
A. Early Beginnings 
Law enforcement agencies and legal scholars recognized 
mandatory recording of interrogations as an advancement in 
criminal justice long before the days of tape recorders.  In fact, Yale 
Professor Edwin Borchard first advocated for mandatory recording 
using phonographic records in 1932.15  The National Commission 
on Law Observance and Enforcement (Wickersham Commission) 
was one of the earliest groups to support recording interrogations 
as a means to “remedy” the “evil” of third-degree police tactics.16  
These early advocates viewed recording as a method to prevent 
false confessions, increase the effective administration of criminal 
justice, and improve relationships between law enforcement and 
the public.17 
The landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona was the first case 
to draw attention to these issues in 1966.18  Miranda held that the 
failure to warn a suspect of his right to counsel and his right to 
remain silent prior to a custodial interrogation renders the 
suspect’s statements inadmissible.19  While Miranda assured courts 
 
 13. See infra Part IV.  
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE xvii (Yale Univ. Press 1970) (1932); see also Gail Johnson, False Confessions 
and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719, 749 (1997) (noting Borchard’s assertion that police should 
record all questioning of suspects).  
 16. U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, Lawlessness in 
Law Enforcement, in 11 U.S. WICKERSHAM COMM’N REPORTS 1, 5 (1931) [hereinafter 
WICKERSHAM REPORT].  
 17. See Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The 
Need for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability 
and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 619, 621 (2004) (summarizing the 
history and policy behind recording interrogations). 
 18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Today, most jurisdictions require recording Miranda 
warnings and have extended the recording throughout the entire interrogation.  
See Lisa C. Oliver, Mandatory Recording of Custodial Interrogations Nationwide: 
Recommending a New Model, 39 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 263, 267 (2005). 
 19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468–77.  
3
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that the defendant understood his rights, uncertainty remained as 
to what actually occurred in interrogations.20  “Defendants and 
police often differ at trial over whether police followed Miranda, 
whether the defendant waived his or her right to remain silent, and 
whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily confessed to the 
crime charged.”21  In these situations, the fact-finder must resort to 
“testimony that provides biased guidance: either it comes from 
officers who want the statement admitted, or it comes from the 
defendant who wants it suppressed.”22  
It did not take long before organizations formally recognized 
the inherent dilemma of relying on testimony regarding the 
circumstances of the interrogation.  The American Law Institute 
(ALI) regarded mandatory recording as the obvious solution to this 
problem, and enacted a Model Code of Pre-Arraignment 
Procedure (Model Code) in 1975 that required police officers to 
record all interrogations.23  The National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also provided guidelines 
that similarly required recording.24 
B. States Take the Lead While the Feds Lag Behind 
The movement for mandatory recording was slow to gain 
momentum among individual jurisdictions.  It was not until 1985 
that Alaska became the first jurisdiction to adopt a recording 
requirement.25  In Stephan v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court held 
 
 20. Daniel D. Donovan & John Rhodes, The Case for Recording Interrogations, 61 
MONT. L. REV. 223, 226 (2000).  Although the Supreme Court itself has noted that 
the secrecy of interrogations “results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact 
goes on in the interrogation rooms,” the Court has never addressed whether 
recording interrogations should be mandatory.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448; Oliver, 
supra note 18, at 268. 
 21. State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 884 n.1 (2009).  
 22. Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 20, at 226. 
 23. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.4(3) (1975).  The 
Model Code contributed significantly to Minnesota’s recording requirement.  See 
infra note 41 and accompanying text.  
 24. UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 10 (Second Tentative Draft 1973) (setting forth the 
proper procedure for questioning an individual). 
 25. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1994).  The Stephan 
decision was composed of two separate cases that were consolidated due to similar 
factual issues and a common legal issue.  Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159 
(Alaska 1985).  In both cases, the defendants were arrested, interrogated, and 
subsequently confessed.  Id. at 1158.  Also in both cases, there was a working audio 
or video recorder in the interrogation room that the police used to record some, 
but not all of the interrogations.  Id. 
4
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that the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution required 
recording a defendant’s custodial interrogation.26  The majority was 
“convinced that recording, in such circumstances, [was] a 
reasonable and necessary safeguard, essential to the adequate 
protection of the accused’s right to counsel, his right against self 
incrimination and, ultimately, his right to a fair trial.”27  After 
previously recommending this practice,28 the court intended to 
deter future noncompliance by creating an exclusionary rule that 
precludes admission of unrecorded interrogations at trial.29  
Minnesota was the first state to follow Alaska’s lead.30  In State v. 
Scales, police interrogated the defendant, a murder suspect, for 
three hours before a formal statement was recorded.31  Similar to 
the Alaska court, the Minnesota Supreme Court had previously 
urged law enforcement officers to record interrogations.32  In Scales, 
“disturbed by the fact that law enforcement officials ignored [the 
court’s] warnings,” the court held that, where feasible, all custodial 
interrogations must be electronically recorded if they occur at a 
place of detention.33  The court was largely persuaded by the 
 
 26.  Stephen, 711 P.2d at 1159.  Similar to early legal commentators, the Alaska 
Supreme Court recognized that recording not only protects a defendant’s rights, 
but also “protects the public’s interest in honest and effective law enforcement . . . 
.”  Id. at 1161. 
 27.  Id. at 1159–60. 
 28.  See Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 743 n.5 (Alaska 1980) (informing 
police that “it is incumbent upon them” to record custodial interrogations); see also 
S.B. v. State, 614 P.2d 786, 790 n.9 (Alaska 1980) (“In future cases, it will be a great 
aid to the trial court’s determinations and our own review of the record if an 
electronic record of the police interview with a defendant is available . . . .” (citing 
Mallott, 608 P.2d at 743 n.5)); McMahan v. State, 617 P.2d 494, 499 n.11 (Alaska 
1980) (“Again we advise law enforcement agencies that, as part of their duty to 
preserve evidence, it is incumbent upon them to tape record, where feasible, any 
questioning and particularly that which occurs in a place of detention.” (citing 
Mallott, 608 P.2d at 743 n.5)).  
 29.  Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1164.  
 30.  State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591–92 (Minn. 1994). 
 31.  Id. at 590. 
 32.  See State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991) (warning that the 
court would “look with great disfavor upon any further refusal to heed these 
admonitions”); State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 224 n.5 (Minn. 1988) (urging 
recording conversations between police and suspects to avoid factual disputes and 
preserve the integrity of the interrogation).  These cases, as well as Scales, stem 
from the protection of defendants’ constitutional rights against compelled self-
incrimination and the procedures required by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 33.  Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592.  However, the court nonetheless affirmed 
Scales’s conviction because the remaining evidence was strong and the result 
5
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reasoning employed in Stephan,34 but unlike Alaska, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court declined to address whether recording is a due 
process requirement under the Minnesota Constitution.35  Instead, 
it decided that recording falls within the court’s supervisory powers 
to “insure the fair administration of justice.”36  
Following the instruction in Scales,37 Minnesota courts have 
fostered the new recording requirement on a case-by-case basis.38  
In their analyses, courts have consistently applied a two-part test to 
determine whether to admit unrecorded statements.39  First, courts 
must determine whether Scales applies to the facts of the case.40  
Second, if Scales applies, courts must proceed to examine whether 
the violation is “substantial” based on factors enumerated in the 
Model Code.41  Since Scales, courts have addressed a myriad of 
issues pertaining to the recording requirement, adapted the 
requirement where necessary, and created exceptions to the rule 
through case law.42 
 
would have been the same.  Id. at 593. 
 34.  Id. at 592 (citing Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1150–60). 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id. (citing State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 
(1967). 
 37.  Id. 
 38. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 42. 
 39. See, e.g., State v. Inman, 692 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2005) (outlining the 
two steps in analyzing an alleged Scales violation); State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 
674 (Minn. 1998) (finding that Scales applied because the defendant was in 
custody, but that the violation was not substantial pursuant to the second step of 
the test); State v. Schroeder, 560 N.W.2d 739, 740 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (denying 
suppression of the defendant’s statements because the alleged Scales violation was 
not substantial pursuant to the second step of the test); see also 7 HENRY W. 
MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL LAW & 
PROCEDURE § 6.14 (3d ed. 2009).  
 40. See, e.g., Inman, 692 N.W.2d at 80. 
 41. See, e.g., id.  Inman provides a useful summary of the pertinent factors:  
These circumstances include the extent to which the violation was willful, 
the extent to which the exclusion will tend to prevent future violations, 
the extent to which the violation is likely to have influenced the 
defendant’s decision to make the statement, and the extent to which the 
violation prejudiced the defendant’s ability to support his motion to 
suppress or to defend himself at trial. 
Id. at 80 n.3 (citing Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592; MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT 
PROCEDURE § 150.3(3)(b), (d), (f), (g) (1975)). 
 42.  See, e.g., State v. Conger, 652 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Minn. 2002) (holding that 
the recording requirement does not extend to non-custodial interrogations); State 
v. Coleman, 560 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that unrecorded 
custodial statements may be used to impeach defendant’s inconsistent trial 
testimony); State v. Gilmartin, 535 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) 
6
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As the courts continued to develop the Scales recording 
requirement, the practice of mandatory recording slowly expanded 
beyond Minnesota’s borders.43  Even though technology has 
advanced,44 the same policy promoted by early legal scholars has 
continued to serve as the foundation for mandatory recording.45  
Contemporary legal scholars have echoed their predecessors and 
found that recording facilitates truth-finding, fairness, 
accountability, and, consequently, the law’s integrity.46  State courts, 
legislators, and law enforcement agencies across the country have 
agreed and adopted their own recording requirements.47  Further, 
many prestigious organizations have endorsed recording custodial 
interrogations, including the American Bar Association.48  
Despite the overwhelming support for reform on the state 
level, neither the United States Supreme Court nor Congress has 
addressed the issue.49  Surprisingly, federal law enforcement 
 
(holding that the reading of the implied consent advisory is not subject to Scales).  
 43.  In 2003, Illinois became the first state to adopt legislation requiring that 
all custodial interrogations in homicide cases be electronically recorded.  See 725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1 (2003) (amended 2005). 
 44.  Not surprisingly, in some cases technological advancements have promoted 
mandatory recording because jurors find it increasingly difficult to accept police 
officers’ assertions that they did not tape interrogations because it was not their 
policy to do so.  Angela Rozas & Joshua Howes, 2 Juries Dubious Over Confession 
Tapes’ Merits; They Wanted Interrogations Included, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 2003, at C1. 
 45.  See Drizin & Reich, supra note 17, at 622. 
 46.  See Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 20, at 227.  
 47.  Most jurisdictions have codified recording requirements.  See D.C. CODE § 
5-116.01 (Supp. 2007); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 25, § 2803-B(1)(K) (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-402 (LexisNexis 
2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4503 (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-16 (Supp. 2009); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-211 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 968.073 (2007).  However, a New 
Jersey court rule and court rulings in Iowa and Massachusetts require recording 
interrogations.  N.J. CT. R. 3:17; State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 455–56 (Iowa 
2006); Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533–34 (Mass. 2004).  
At the same time, over six hundred police departments voluntarily record 
custodial interrogations.  Thomas P. Sullivan, Recording Federal Custodial Interviews, 
45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1297, 1313 (2008) [hereinafter Recording Federal Interviews] 
(discussing federal agencies’ opposition to recording despite the progression of 
recording requirements throughout the country).  
 48. ABA RESOLUTION, supra note 4 (urging legislatures or courts to enact laws 
or rules requiring the practice of recording); see also THE JUSTICE PROJECT, 
ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW, available 
at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/national/solution/electronic-recording/ 
[hereinafter THE JUSTICE PROJECT] (promoting mandatory recording to guard 
against false confessions). 
 49.  Joshua M. Snavely, Note, The Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: 
Who Gets to Hold the Remote? A Separation of Powers Battle, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
7
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agencies, which are ordinarily “leaders in the use of innovative 
investigative methods[,]” have similarly objected to implementing a 
requirement.50  
Nonetheless, as described by one commentator, “[a] 
movement is under way in the United States to adopt the practice 
of recording custodial” interrogations.51  As laws develop around 
recording requirements in Minnesota and the rest of the country, 
courts will continue to face new issues concerning the scope of 
their application.  State v. Sanders, in which the Minnesota Supreme 
Court considered whether the recording requirement applied to 
custodial interrogations conducted outside Minnesota, is a case in 
point.52 
III. THE SANDERS DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
In 2004, Jonathan Sanders lived with S.J. and S.J.’s daughter, 
B.J., who was eleven years old at the time.53  Sanders allegedly 
sexually assaulted B.J. while Sanders was home alone with her on 
October 29, 2004.54  After B.J. told her mother what happened, S.J. 
called the St. Paul Police Department, and B.J. described the 
incident to the police.55  S.J. suggested to the police that Sanders 
might have fled to Chicago.56 
The St. Paul Police Department issued a warrant and worked 
with the Minneapolis office of the FBI to apprehend Sanders.57  
The Minneapolis office then contacted the FBI agents in the 
Chicago office for assistance in locating Sanders based on S.J.’s 
belief that Sanders may have fled to Chicago.58  FBI agents in 
Chicago eventually apprehended Sanders at his mother’s residence 
on May 24, 2005, and interrogated him at a Chicago Police 
 
193, 196 (2010) (providing an overview of recording at both the state and federal 
level). 
 50.  Recording Federal Interviews, supra note 47, at 1303. 
 51.  Id. at 1311. 
 52.  775 N.W.2d 883, 886 (Minn. 2009). 
 53.  Id. at 885. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id.  B.J. also told her mother and the police that Sanders had initiated 
sexual contact with her on two earlier occasions.  Id.  
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id.  
8
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Department booking station.59  However, the agents did not record 
the session because electronic recording was not required under 
Illinois law or FBI policy.60 
At trial, the district court ruled that Scales does not apply to 
interrogations conducted outside Minnesota and allowed one of 
the FBI agents to testify about the interrogation.61  The FBI agent 
testified that Sanders waived his constitutional rights and agreed to 
be interviewed despite refusing to sign an “Advice-of-Rights” form.62  
The agent further testified that, during the interview, Sanders 
made several explicit statements and denied having sexual contact 
with B.J.63  When Sanders testified in trial, he continued to deny 
committing the offense, but also claimed that the FBI agent 
fabricated the other statements attributed to him.64 
The State, however, did not focus its argument in trial on the 
testimony provided by the FBI agent.65  Instead, it focused its 
argument on B.J.’s testimony and expert testimony that Sanders 
could be a source of the DNA found on the towel that Sanders 
allegedly used after sexually assaulting B.J.66  The jury subsequently 
found Sanders guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.67 
B. The Court of Appeals Decision 
Sanders appealed his conviction, arguing in part that the 
district court committed reversible error when it admitted the 
unrecorded statements he made to the FBI agents during his 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id.; see FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL 
HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS § 7-8(1) (1978), available at http://foia.fbi.gov
/legal_handbook_spec_agent/legal_handbooks_spec_agent.pdf.  Coincidentally, 
Illinois enacted a statute mandating electronic recording of all custodial 
interrogations that was effective less than three months later on August 6, 2005.  
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1 (2006). 
 61.  Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 886.  
 62.  Id. at 885. 
 63.  Id. at 886.  These statements included: 
(1) he did not ‘f* * * ’ B.J.; (2) he masturbated throughout the house on 
a regular basis, including B.J.’s room, but not while she was present; (3) 
he would not have sex with B.J., because he believed that she had a 
venereal disease . . . and (4) he had never observed B.J.’s genitalia. 
State v. Sanders, 743 N.W.2d 616, 618–19 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d 775 N.W.2d 
883 (Minn. 2009). 
 64.  Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 886. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
9
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interrogation.68  In support, he asserted that the Scales recording 
requirement applied to the interrogation because “while the 
Minnesota courts do not have jurisdiction over Illinois or FBI 
procedure, the Scales requirement is a procedural requirement in 
Minnesota and courts of this state have the power to admit or 
exclude evidence obtained elsewhere if state standards are not 
met.”69  Accordingly, Sanders argued that the court had the power 
to exclude the evidence from the interrogation.70 
The court of appeals focused its analysis on the supreme 
court’s intent behind the Scales requirement, as well as its 
underlying policy.71  The court pointed out that the considerations 
taken into account when determining whether Scales was 
substantially violated include “whether the act was a willful 
deviation from lawful conduct and whether exclusion of evidence 
would deter future violations.”72  In light of these considerations, 
the court reasoned that Scales “is a state procedural rule intended 
to govern conduct occurring within the state.”73  Because the FBI 
did not willfully deviate from lawful conduct and suppression of the 
interrogation evidence would not prevent future violations, the 
court of appeals ruled that the district court did not err by 
admitting Sanders’s statement.74 
C. The Supreme Court Decision  
1. Majority Opinion 
Unlike either of the lower courts’ approaches to Sanders, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court applied a harmless-error analysis rather 
than first addressing whether Scales even applied to the case.75  The 
court noted that there are two different harmless-error tests 
 
 68.  Sanders, 743 N.W.2d at 618. Sanders also argued that the court erred by 
admitting evidence of prior sexual misconduct against B.J. and her sister.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 620. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. (citing State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 n.5 (Minn. 1994)). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id.  Oddly, by deciding this issue the court in essence applied the second 
step of the two-part analysis in Scales, even though it also decided that the facts 
failed the scope requirement in the first step of the analysis.  See cases cited supra 
note 39 and accompanying text. 
 75.  State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 886, 887 (Minn. 2009). 
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depending on whether the error implicates a constitutional right.76  
The court acknowledged that it was unclear which harmless-error 
test to use due to the fact that, in Scales, they declined to determine 
whether the recording requirement is a due process right of the 
Minnesota Constitution.77  Rather than determining which test 
applies to an alleged Scales violation, the court simply applied the 
“more favorable constitutional harmless-error standard” in its 
analysis.78 
Under this test, the State must “show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error was harmless[,]” which requires proving that 
“the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the error.”79  
Ultimately, the court determined that the jury’s verdict was “surely 
unattributable” to the admission of the FBI agent’s testimony 
because it was not highly persuasive and the evidence of Sanders’s 
guilt was strong.80  Further, the court concluded that it 
subsequently “need not, and [would] not, decide whether the Scales 
recording rule applies to custodial interrogations conducted 
outside of Minnesota or whether the alleged Scales violation . . . was 
substantial.”81  As a result, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed 
Sanders’s conviction.82 
2. Concurring Opinion 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Paul Anderson agreed with 
the result reached by the majority that the district court did not err 
by admitting the interrogation evidence.83  However, Justice 
Anderson wrote separately because he did not entirely agree with 
the approach the majority used to reach this result.84 
 
 
 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 888. 
 79.  Id. at 887 (citing State v. Shoen, 598 N.W.2d 370, 377 (Minn. 1999); State 
v. Scott, 501 N.W.2d 608, 619 (Minn. 1993)). 
 80. Id. (applying criteria established in State v. Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d 744, 
748 (Minn. 2005) and State v. Hall, 764 N.W.2d 837, 842 (Minn. 2009)).  Indeed, 
as the court pointed out, the FBI agent’s testimony actually supported Sanders’s 
claim that he did not commit the sexual act because it demonstrated that Sanders 
“immediately and consistently denied the offense.”  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 889. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. (Anderson, J., concurring). 
 84.  Id. 
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Essentially, Justice Anderson agreed that the case should have 
been decided using a harmless-error analysis, but only after first 
holding that Scales applied to Sanders’s interrogation.85  In Justice 
Anderson’s eyes, the interrogation should have been recorded, and 
thus the FBI agent’s failure to record violated Scales.86  Nonetheless, 
he concluded that the evidence was “neither inculpatory nor 
prejudicial to Sanders[,]” so the error was harmless and Sanders’s 
conviction was properly affirmed.87  
Justice Anderson largely based his belief that Scales applied to 
the interrogation conducted outside Minnesota on policy 
considerations.88  Specifically, he pointed to the positive effects 
Scales has had in the criminal justice system over the past fourteen 
years, including protection of defendants’ rights and efficacy of law 
enforcement.89  With this in mind, he agreed with the dissent that 
“the rationale underlying Scales should and does apply with equal 
force to interrogations conducted both within and outside 
Minnesota.”90   
3. Dissenting Opinion 
Similar to Justice Anderson, Justice Page and Justice Meyer 
criticized the majority’s analysis in their dissent.91  In fact, they 
plainly stated that the majority “ignore[d] both steps” of the two-
step analysis used when addressing alleged violations of the Scales 
recording requirement.92  For that reason, the dissent pointedly 
applied the two-step analysis to the facts of the case in their 
separate opinion.93 
First, the dissent opined that Scales applied to the interrogation 
conducted in Illinois.94  As Justice Anderson stated in his 
concurrence, Scales applied to the interrogation because the 
underlying policy applied with equal force regardless of whether 
the interrogation was conducted within Minnesota’s borders.95  
 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  See id. 
 89.  Id. at 890. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See id. at 890–91 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 92.  Id. at 891. 
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Id.  The dissent analogized this case to others in which the court 
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Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the requirement was 
violated when the Chicago FBI agents did not record the 
interrogation in Chicago.96  Second, the dissent decided— pursuant 
to the second step of the two-part analysis—that the Scales violation 
was substantial.97  The dissent reached this conclusion using the 
factors outlined in the Model Code, specifically holding that the 
failure to record was willful and prejudicial.98  
 Although the dissenting justices disagreed with the majority’s 
use of a harmless-error analysis, they nonetheless conducted their 
own harmless-error analysis to counter the majority’s conclusion 
that the jury’s verdict was unattributable to admission of FBI 
agent’s testimony.99  Unlike the majority, the dissent concluded that 
the State did use the FBI agent’s testimony to undermine Sanders’s 
credibility.100  The dissent opined that Sanders’s credibility was a 
central issue in the case and prevented the conclusion that the 
jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the error in admitting the 
testimony.101  Ultimately, the dissent concluded that Sanders’s 
conviction should have been reversed and the case remanded for a 
new trial based on the foregoing analysis.102 
 
considered the admissibility of evidence from events that occurred outside of 
Minnesota.  Id. at 892 n.2 (citing State v. Reece, 625 N.W.2d 822, 825–26 (Minn. 
2001); State v. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731, 736–37 (Minn. 1985)).  
 96.  Id. at 892. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.3 (2), (3) 
(1975)). As the dissent pointed out, the FBI agent’s failure to record the 
interrogation was willful even though he was following both Illinois law and FBI 
policy.  Id.  The dissent notes that under section 150.3(2)(a) of the Model Code, 
“[a] violation shall be deemed willful regardless of the good faith of the individual 
officer if it appears to be part of the practice of the law enforcement agency or was 
authorized by a high authority within it.”  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 893.  The dissent noted that “it is unclear which harmless-error 
analysis should be applied to a Scales violation, if one should be applied at all.”  Id.  
Because the majority used the constitutional standard for reviewing harmless 
error, the dissent followed suit.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 895. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SANDERS DECISION 
A. The Need for a Clear Precedent 
The fundamental question in Sanders was clear: does the 
recording requirement apply to custodial interrogations conducted 
outside Minnesota?103  Scales provided plain instructions104 for future 
courts to decide such an issue, which the courts have consistently 
followed.105  Nonetheless, the supreme court entirely sidestepped 
the question and left the door open to a revisitation of the issue.106 
There are two reasons why the court should not have disposed 
of the case without ruling on whether Scales applies to 
interrogations conducted outside Minnesota.  First, the inherent 
structure of the Scales requirement necessitates the court’s initiative 
to decide issues of first impression, such as the question posed in 
Sanders.107  Second, it is practically inevitable that the court will have 
to revisit the issue unless it sets a clear precedent for the lower 
courts to follow.108 
1. The Inherent Structure of the Recording Requirement 
The Minnesota Supreme Court was arguably following a 
principle of judicial modesty by declining to decide whether Scales 
applies to custodial interrogations conducted outside Minnesota.109  
Ordinarily, most legal scholars and commentators agree that such 
minimalism is an acceptable, and perhaps even an encouraged, 
 
 103.  Id. at 886. 
 104.  State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (“The parameters of 
the exclusionary rule . . . must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 105.  See cases cited supra note 39. 
 106.  Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 889 (concluding the court need not decide 
“whether the Scales recording rule applies to a custodial interrogation conducted 
outside Minnesota.”).  In fact, the issue already arose in the short time since 
Sanders was decided in 2009.  See In re Welfare of C.M.D., No. A09-825, 2010 WL 
607090 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2010) (noting the presence of a potential Scales 
issue with appellant’s unrecorded interrogation in Texas). 
 107.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 108.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 109.  See infra note 110.  In declining to address the issue, the court also 
asserted that “certain deficiencies in the record complicate a discussion of whether 
the alleged Scales violation in this case was substantial” and whether it applies to 
out-of-state interrogations.  Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 889 n.5. 
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approach for the judiciary.110  However, the inherent structure of 
the Scales recording requirement obliges the court to abandon the 
generally encouraged notions of judicial modesty and squarely 
address pertinent issues of first impression. 
The supreme court created the Scales recording requirement 
through its supervisory power,111 and contemporaneously held that 
the “parameters of the exclusionary rule . . . must be decided on a 
case-by-case basis.”112  As a result, there is little guidance for 
implementing the requirement until it is litigated because courts 
are in exclusive control of the requirement’s development.  The 
flexibility of a case-by-case approach is conceivably advantageous in 
some respects,113 but it does not take into account practical 
problems or exigent circumstances that police may encounter 
during the course of an interrogation.114  In fact, Minnesota’s 
approach has been criticized for its lack of “detailed provisions for 
unforeseen circumstances and inevitable glitches . . . .”115  
Consequently, it is imperative that courts squarely address issues of 
first impression involving the recording requirement to ensure its 
effective implementation. 
2. The Inevitable Revisitation 
Interestingly, the issue of whether Scales applies to 
interrogations conducted outside Minnesota did not arise in the 
higher courts prior to Sanders, but within a mere two months of the 
Sanders decision it arose in the court of appeals.116  
 
 
 110.  See, e.g., The Honorable William H. Pryor, Jr., The Perspective of a Junior 
Circuit Judge on Judicial Modesty, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1007, 1015 (2008) (“Modesty 
improves judicial decisionmaking and enhances the security of the judiciary in our 
constitutional structure.”).  
 111.  State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (“[I]n the exercise of 
our supervisory power to insure the fair administration of justice, we hold that all 
custodial interrogations . . . shall be electronically recorded . . . .”). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  For instance, a case-by-case basis “allow[s] officers and prosecutors ample 
opportunity to demonstrate valid reasons for not recording the interrogation.”  See 
THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 48, at 4. 
 114.  See Everybody Wins, supra note 1, at 1131 (advocating for states to 
implement recording through legislation to provide for more detailed provisions). 
 115.  Id. at 1137. 
 116.  See In re Welfare of C.M.D., No. A09-825, 2010 WL 607090 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Feb. 23, 2010) (in which the defendant challenged the admissibility of his 
interrogation conducted in Texas). 
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In an unpublished case, In re Welfare of C.M.D., the defendant 
was alleged to have committed criminal sexual conduct in St. Paul, 
Minnesota, and was later apprehended in Texas by the Abilene 
Police Department.117  A St. Paul police officer requested the 
Abilene officer to interview the defendant, but, in accordance with 
Texas legal procedure, the Abilene officer only recorded the 
defendant’s Miranda waiver and prepared an oral statement 
admitting to the offense.118  In its opinion, the court of appeals 
specifically highlighted the fact that the Sanders court declined to 
address whether Scales applies to out-of-state interrogations,119 and 
similarly disposed of the case without resolving the issue.120 
One could easily contend that the timely occurrence of this 
case alone is sufficient proof that unrecorded interrogations 
conducted outside Minnesota will continue to be challenged as 
alleged Scales violations.  Yet there are two additional reasons why 
the higher courts will continue to face the issue in their courtrooms 
until they create a stable precedent. 
First, policies for recording vary by jurisdiction121 and most 
federal agencies are opposed to adopting a mandatory recording 
policy.122  Without a definitive resolution of the issue, Minnesota law 
enforcement agencies are left without procedural guidance when 
working in joint federal-state operations, interstate operations, or 
both.123  As a result, out-of-state interrogations may be unrecorded 
in such operations.  Defendants will likely challenge the admission 
of the interrogations in trial, and, regardless of which direction the 
court rules, the losing party will undoubtedly use Scales as an outlet 
to appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 117.  Id. at *2. 
 118.  Id. at *3.  On appeal, the defendant argued that this constituted a 
substantial violation of Scales because the interview was not recorded in its entirety.  
Id. at *7. 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Id. at *8. 
 121.  See sources cited supra note 47. 
 122.  See generally Recording Federal Interviews, supra note 47 (discussing federal 
agencies’ opposition to recording despite the progression of recording 
requirements throughout the country). 
 123.  Both Illinois law and FBI policy prevented the FBI agents from recording 
the interrogation in Sanders.  See sources cited supra note 47 and 98. 
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Second, in its avoidance of addressing the issue, the court 
deviated from the well-established two-part test,124 and instead 
applied a harmless-error analysis.125  Yet the court also declined to 
determine which harmless-error analysis should be employed for 
alleged Scales violations.126  As previously discussed, the majority’s 
analysis in this case even confounded fellow justices on the 
bench.127  The lower courts will likely be similarly perplexed by the 
analysis, and may apply different tests when faced with an 
unrecorded interrogation conducted in another jurisdiction.128  In 
turn, the confusion could lead to inconsistent precedent and 
potentially conflicting results that litigants will appeal to the higher 
courts. 
Thus, it is seemingly inevitable that the supreme court will 
have to revisit the issue.  Rather than sidestepping it again, the 
court should create clear precedent and squarely address whether 
the recording requirement applies to out-of-state custodial 
interrogations.129  This will ensure procedural clarity for law 
enforcement, consistency in the courts, and ultimately promote 
judicial economy.130  Yet the question remains: should the Scales 
recording requirement apply to all custodial interrogations 
regardless of whether they were conducted within Minnesota? 
 
 124.  See cases cited supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 125.  State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn. 2009). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  The concurring and dissenting justices in Sanders criticized the majority’s 
approach for this reason.  Justice Anderson pointed out that “[t]he majority 
appears to assume without deciding that the Scales rule applies to out-of-state 
custodial interrogations.”  Id. at 889 (Anderson, J., concurring).  Likewise, Justice 
Page commented that “the court ignores both steps” of the two-part analysis.  Id. at 
891 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 128.  In fact, this has already occurred.  The In re Welfare of C.M.D. court 
applied the two-part analysis announced in Scales rather than the harmless-error 
analysis used in Sanders.  In re Welfare of C.M.D., No. A09-825, 2010 WL 607090 at 
*7–8 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2010). 
 129.  One commentator similarly encourages agencies to “craft policies that 
take into account the increasingly international, multi-jurisdictional, and multi-
agency nature of their cases.”  Julie Renee Linkins, Satisfy the Demands of Justice: 
Embrace Electronic Recordings of Custodial Investigative Interviews Through Legislation, 
Agency Policy, or Court Mandate, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 141, 164 (2007). 
 130.  The Justice Project recognized the importance of defining the scope of 
the recording requirement “so that law enforcement officers know immediately 
whether recording is required in a given case.”  THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 
48, at 4. 
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B. Formulating the Appropriate Precedent 
By evaluating the scope of the recording requirement’s 
authority131 and the underlying policy of its enactment,132 it is clear 
that the supreme court should have held that Scales does not apply 
to interrogations conducted outside Minnesota. 
1. Supervisory Power 
As previously discussed,133 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
exercised its supervisory power to implement the Scales 
exclusionary rule.134  To determine whether Scales applies to 
interrogations conducted outside Minnesota, it is helpful to 
understand the scope of this particular authority and whether it 
extends to other jurisdictions and their agencies. 
Ordinarily, the scope of any legal authority is best ascertained 
by referring to its source.135  However, the source of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s supervisory power has been the subject of 
debate.136  The supreme court has previously stated its “supervisory 
power derives from [its] power to supervise the trial court.”137  Yet 
the court never actually cited an authority or basis for this power to 
 
 131.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 132.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 133.  See supra Part III.C. 
 134.  State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994).  Other states have also 
avoided using their respective state constitutions as the foundation for a recording 
requirement and instead used court authority to implement a recording 
requirement.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533–34 
(Mass. 2004) (implementing special jury instructions when interrogations are not 
recorded); State v. Cook, 847 A.2d 530, 542–43 (N.J. 2004) (implementing court 
rule for recording interrogations). 
 135.  While examining the vague parameters of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s supervisory power, Gary O’Connor similarly emphasized the importance 
of understanding the source of the court’s power.  See Gary E. O’Connor, 
Rule(make)r and Judge: Minnesota Courts and the Supervisory Power, 23 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 605, 626 (1997).  He stated: 
In discussing or analyzing any power that a court possesses, it is 
important to know not only the source of the power, but also when and 
how a court will exercise that power.  Without such knowledge, a danger 
exists that the power will become a too-willing servant of the court’s 
caprice or whim; a servant with no fixed duties, boundaries, or standards 
of propriety. 
Id. 
 136.  See generally id. (discussing the possible sources and scope of supervisory 
power for both the Minnesota Supreme Court and Court of Appeals). 
 137.  Umphlett v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 533 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1995) (citing State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 1993)). 
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supervise.138  Some assert that the Minnesota Constitution 
authorizes the supreme court’s supervisory power.139  Yet, unlike 
other states, the state constitution does not expressly grant 
supervisory power to the Minnesota Supreme Court.140  Instead, the 
Minnesota Constitution vests the “judicial power of the state” in the 
courts, and the supreme court has “appellate jurisdiction in all 
cases.”141 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See, e.g., Eric J. Magnuson & David F. Herr, 3 MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: 
CASE DISPOSITIONAL PROCEDURES OF THE SUPREME COURT app. D (2010 ed.) (“The 
Minnesota Constitution, in Article VI, § 2, confers upon the supreme court . . . 
supervisory jurisdiction over all courts of the state.”). 
 140.  In other states’ constitutions, this power is commonly described as 
“superintending control” and is referred to in express terms.  See, e.g., ARK. CONST. 
amend. 80, § 4 (“The Supreme Court shall exercise general superintending 
control over all courts of the state . . . .”); COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 2(1) (“The 
supreme court . . . shall have a general superintending control over all inferior 
courts . . . .”); IOWA CONST. art. 5, § 4 (“The supreme court . . . shall exercise a 
supervisory and administrative control over all inferior judicial tribunals 
throughout the state.”); LA. CONST. art. 5, § 5(A) (“The supreme court has general 
supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts.”); MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 4 (“The 
supreme court shall have a general superintending control over all courts . . . .”); 
MO. CONST. art. 5, § 4(1) (“The supreme court shall have general superintending 
control over all courts and tribunals.”); MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(2) (“[The 
supreme court] has general supervisory control over all other courts.”); N.M. 
CONST. art. 6, § 3 (“The supreme court . . . shall have a superintending control 
over all inferior courts . . . .”); N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1) (“[The supreme court] 
may issue any remedial writs necessary to give it general supervision and control 
over the proceedings of the other courts.”); OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (“The 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general 
superintending control over all inferior courts and all Agencies, Commissions and 
Boards created by law.”); PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(a) (“The Supreme Court shall 
exercise general supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts and 
justices of the peace . . . .”); S.D. CONST. art. V, § 12 (“The Supreme Court shall 
have general superintending powers over all courts and may make rules of practice 
and procedure and rules governing the administration of all courts.”); WIS. CONST. 
art. 7, § 3(1) (“The supreme court shall have superintending and administrative 
authority over all courts.”); WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 2 (“The supreme court . . . shall 
have a general superintending control over all inferior courts . . . .”). 
 141.  MINN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 2. 
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Likewise, unlike other states, no Minnesota statute expressly 
vests the supreme court with supervisory power.142  Instead, 
Minnesota law grants the supreme court the power to prescribe 
and modify the rules of practice, as well as the power to “regulate 
the pleadings, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in 
criminal actions in all courts of this state, by rules promulgated by it 
from time to time.”143 
Despite the debatable source of the supreme court’s 
supervisory power,144 there seemingly has been no uncertainty as to 
whether the court possesses that power since it was first exercised in 
the late 1960s.145  In fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
increasingly exercised its supervisory power in recent years aside 
from its execution in the Scales decision.146  However, the 
application of the court’s supervisory power in these cases has been 
limited to judicial procedure of the courts, prosecutorial conduct, 
or court rules.147  Other states with express constitutional or 
statutory grants of supervisory power similarly limit the scope of this 
 
 142.  See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 602–04 (2007) (“The supreme court shall have 
the general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to prevent and 
correct errors and abuses therein where no other remedy is expressly provided by 
law.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (2005) (“The supreme judicial court shall 
have general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and 
prevent errors and abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly provided . . . .”); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:4 (2009) (“The supreme court shall have general 
superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to prevent and correct errors 
and abuses . . . .”). 
 143.  MINN. STAT. § 480.059 (2008). 
 144.  O’Connor ultimately concluded that the supreme court’s supervisory 
power must either stem from some inherent judicial power or some inherited 
common-law power.  O’Connor, supra note 135, at 626. 
 145.  The supreme court first exercised its supervisory power in 1967 in State v. 
Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967).  In this case, the court 
required counsel to be provided to an indigent defendant in any case that may 
lead to incarceration in a penal institution.  Id. at 396, 154 N.W.2d at 893.  Since 
Borst, the court of appeals has acknowledged that supervisory powers are reserved 
to the supreme court.  See State v. Gilmartin, 535 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995) (“As an intermediate appellate court, we decline to exercise supervisory 
powers reserved to this state’s supreme court.”). 
 146.  See, e.g., State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 2005) (holding that the 
supreme court retains the “right to grant a new trial ‘prophylactically or in the 
interests of justice’ without a further determination of prejudice”); Powell v. 
Anderson, 660 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 2003) (holding that the supreme court has the 
power to vacate a final decision of the court of appeals under its supervisory 
power); State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. 1995) (holding that the supreme 
court could exercise its supervisory powers to grant the defendant a new trial when 
the prosecutor interfered with juror independence). 
 147.  See cases cited supra note 146. 
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power over inferior courts or tribunals.148  Regardless of what its 
actual source of authority may be, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
supervisory power is presumably limited to authority over the lower 
courts and, by extension, officers of the court and law enforcement 
agents within the State of Minnesota. 
Thus, interrogations conducted by agents in other jurisdictions 
in accordance with their respective laws are not subject to the 
supervisory power exercised in Scales. 
2. Policy Considerations 
Aside from the inherent limitations of the requirement as an 
act of supervisory power, there are important practical policy 
considerations that require limiting Scales to interrogations 
conducted within Minnesota.  The supreme court has relied on the 
policy underlying Scales to determine whether the recording 
requirement applied in past cases.149  Policy should also guide the 
court’s decision as to whether the requirement should apply to 
interrogations conducted outside Minnesota for purposes of 
uniformity.150  To recapitulate, the Scales court intended to limit 
factual disputes about defendants’ statements, promote accuracy, 
discourage misleading and false testimony, curb abusive police 
practices, and preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.151 
While electronic recordation may be the most effective means 
of promoting the foregoing policy, the recording requirement 
should nonetheless refrain from placing undue burden on law 
enforcement agencies that are responsible for its execution.152  In 
 
 148.  See sources cited supra notes 140, 142. 
 149.  E.g., State v. Conger, 652 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Minn. 2002) (holding that 
the “interests of justice” do not require recording all non-custodial 
interrogations). 
 150.  Although they each found that the recording requirement should extend 
to interrogations conducted outside Minnesota, both the concurring and 
dissenting justices in Sanders emphasized policy considerations in their opinions.  
Justice Anderson argued that “the rationale underlying Scales should and does 
apply” to interrogations conducted outside Minnesota.  State v. Sanders, 775 
N.W.2d 883, 890 (Minn. 2009) (Anderson, J., concurring).  The dissent also 
pointed out that “[the court has] never limited [its] concern for a defendant’s 
rights solely to cases involving Minnesota law enforcement or events occurring 
solely within [Minnesota].”  Id. at 891 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 151.  State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1994); see generally supra Part 
II. 
 152.  The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously declined to apply Scales, 
despite acknowledging that that it would be beneficial.  See Conger, 652 N.W.2d at 
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light of this interest, there are several practical policy concerns that 
should be weighed with the underlying policy of Scales.  First, law 
enforcement agencies should only be expected to know the law 
governing interrogations in their respective jurisdictions.  Second, 
even if they are aware of other laws, it is not always clear before the 
interrogation is conducted where a suspect will be prosecuted, so 
they would not know which law to follow.153  Third, law 
enforcement agencies may not have the equipment necessary to 
meet the demands of Scales because not all states have recording 
requirements. 
The first two arguments have long been made in search and 
seizure exclusionary rule analyses.154  Legal scholars in this context 
have argued that applying more restrictive exclusionary rules to 
other jurisdictions would “give inadequate weight to the real-world 
considerations that govern police activity, particularly the not 
unreasonable police expectation that their work is subject to the 
law of their state.”155  The Sanders district court agreed with this 
approach when it held that the recording requirement “does not 
extend, and would be unfair to be extended, to FBI agents or other 
law enforcement officials who are not aware of its terms.”156 
Despite the fact that, unlike the recording requirement, the 
laws of search and seizure are rooted in the Constitution and are 
relatively more developed, the buttressing arguments are quite 
analogous in the electronic recordation context of Scales.  Both 
exclusionary rules in search and seizure and Scales were established 
with the intent to deter police misconduct.157  In both contexts, 
 
708 (declining to apply Scales to non-custodial interrogations). 
 153.  Cf. John Bernard Corr, Criminal Procedure and the Conflict of Laws, 73 GEO. 
L.J. 1217, 1229–30 (1985) (describing how, in the search and seizure context, 
agencies may not know there is an interstate connection until the search is already 
in progress or over, and “[i]n some cases, police may have no opportunity to learn 
in advance which jurisdiction will receive the evidence they obtain.”). 
 154.  See, e.g., Richard Tullis & Linda Ludlow, Admissibility of Evidence Seized in 
Another Jurisdiction: Choice of Law and the Exclusionary Rule, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 67, 80 
(1975) (arguing, among other things, that the forum should admit evidence when 
the search was legal in the situs but illegal in the forum and exclusion would serve 
no deterrent purpose). 
 155.  Corr, supra note 153, at 1228. 
 156.  State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 891 (Minn. 2009) (Page, J., dissenting). 
 157.  Compare 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 358 (2008) (“The prime purpose of this 
[the search and seizure] exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful conduct.”), 
with State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (discussing the court’s 
frustration with the law officials’ failure to record and thereafter creating an 
exclusionary rule if they fail to record).  The Model Code similarly considers “the 
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police who are unaware of applicable law clearly will not be 
deterred from violating it.158  Consequently, not only would 
applying Scales to out-of-state interrogations ignore the “real-
world . . . expectation” of police officers to only know the laws of 
their respective jurisdictions,159 but it would also diverge from the 
central function of the requirement itself.160 
Further, jurisdictions without recording requirements may not 
be equipped with the necessary recording equipment.  Concededly, 
in the current electronic era, many agencies are readily equipped 
with some form of recording equipment.161  Nevertheless, if their 
equipment is unsophisticated or otherwise limited, this creates 
potential for other Scales challenges at trial if the equipment 
malfunctions or does not provide a clear recording.162  In these 
situations, it would create bad public policy to suppress probative 
evidence simply because a police department was only equipped to 
serve its own governing law.163 
With these three practical policy considerations in mind, it is 
evident that excluding valuable evidence obtained in out-of-state 
interrogations presents an ominous proposition for victims of 
 
extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code.”  MODEL 
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.3(3)(d) (1975). 
 158.  See Mary Jane Morrison, Choice of Law for Unlawful Searches, 41 OKLA. L. 
REV. 579, 615 (1988) (“When situs police act lawfully in the situs under situs law, 
suppressing evidence under forum law will have no deterrent effect on situs 
police, who did not know and could not reasonably be expected to know forum 
law when they acted.”). 
 159.  Corr, supra note 153, at 1228. 
 160.  The Scales court made it clear that it believed it was necessary to create an 
exclusionary rule specifically because “law enforcement officials . . . ignored [the 
court’s] warnings” to record in the past.  State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 
(Minn. 1994). 
 161.  See Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as Tools of 
Justice, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771, 795–97 (2005) (discussing both 
equipment currently employed by police departments across the country as well as 
improvement in the recording technologies that are available). 
 162.  In their article advocating for law enforcement agencies to record 
interrogations, an FBI agent and two police officers recognized equipment 
limitations as an “impediment preventing law enforcement agencies from 
routinely electronically recording interrogations.”  Brian Parsi Boetig et al., 
Revealing Incommunicado: Electronic Recording of Police Interrogations, FBI LAW 
ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, (FBI, Wash., D.C.), December 2006, at 1, 3, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2006/dec2006/dec2006leb.htm. 
[hereinafter FBI BULLETIN]. 
 163.  But see supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing jurors’ 
dissatisfaction with the excuse that it is not an agency’s policy to record 
interrogations). 
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crimes and the general public that violent criminals may be easily 
acquitted simply because police followed their local laws and 
policies.164  As the renowned Justice Benjamin Cardozo lamented, 
“[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has 
blundered.”165  To prevent the criminal from going free in this 
context, both the limitation on the requirement’s authority as an 
exercise of the court’s supervisory power and the underlying 
practical policy concerns require finding that Scales does not apply 
to interrogations conducted out of state. 
C. Implementing an Effective Precedent 
Minnesota has previously acknowledged other exigent 
circumstances that excuse a failure to record and, to preserve the 
fruits of interrogations, properly adopted exceptions to the 
requirement.166  The issue of interrogations conducted outside 
Minnesota logically presents another appropriate occasion to adopt 
an exception.  Adopting an exception for out-of-state 
interrogations avoids placing an undue burden on law 
enforcement and is largely enforced in other jurisdictions.167  
However, the exception should be limited to interrogations 
conducted without the involvement of Minnesota law enforcement 
agencies to address the potential for exploitation.168 
1. Adopting an Exception to the Scales Requirement 
Mandatory electronic recordation may be one of the most 
effective reforms in the criminal justice system.169  At the same time, 
commentators have asserted that recording policies are more 
effective with exceptions “so as not to place an undue burden on 
law enforcement and allow for the admission of voluntary 
statements that went unrecorded for valid reasons.”170  Indeed, 
 
 164.  This was one of prosecuting attorney Eric Zahnd’s primary objections to 
creating an exclusionary rule in favor of flexible legislation with exceptions.  See 
Eric G. Zahnd, Missouri’s Experience with Recorded Interrogation Legislation—Prosecutors 
Lead Effort to Pass Sensible Law, 43 PROSECUTOR 36, 38 (2009). 
 165.  People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
 166.  See cases cited supra note 42. 
 167.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 168.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 169.  See State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 889–90 (Minn. 2009) (Anderson, J., 
concurring) (discussing the positive effects Scales has had in Minnesota). 
 170. THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 48, at 4.  The rigidity of a full-fledged 
exclusionary rule without exceptions has driven some jurisdictions to reject a 
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every jurisdiction with a recording requirement, including 
Minnesota, provides constructive exceptions to the rule.171  
Whether Scales applies to out-of-state interrogations is an issue 
of first impression in Minnesota,172 so the court could look to other 
jurisdictions’ policies for guidance.173  Fortunately, as discussed, 
recording requirements have expanded throughout the country,174 
so jurisdictions now have the valuable opportunity to learn from 
the efficacy of one another’s policies.  For example, a coalition of 
prosecutors and police in Missouri recently relied on the 
experience of other states when they drafted proposed legislation 
for a recording requirement.175  Significantly, the coalition used 
what it “believed to be the best parts of the statutes from other 
states,” which included an exception to recording if the 
interrogation is conducted outside the state of Missouri.176 
In fact, all states that have enacted statutory recording 
requirements include exceptions that allow the admission of 
statements made during out-of-state interrogations.177  Several states 
direct more attention to the interrogating party and create an 
exception for interrogations conducted by law enforcement officers 
 
recording requirement.  For example, the Mayor of the District of Columbia 
vetoed proposed legislation precisely because it did not provide for exceptions.  
Everybody Wins, supra note 1, at 1137 n.40.  In his letter to the District of 
Columbia’s City Council, the Mayor stated: 
While I share the Council’s view that electronic recording of 
interrogations is desirable, the sanction to exclude an unrecorded 
statement, no matter what the circumstances of the non-recording may 
be, goes too far and provides an unacceptable vehicle for violent and 
dangerous offenders to escape criminal prosecution . . . . To impose the 
rule of exclusion when an officer inadvertently fails to record a statement 
punishes the victim and the public far more than the police. 
Id. (citing Letter from the Honorable Anthony A. Williams, Mayor of 
Washington, D.C., to the Honorable Linda W. Cropp, Chairman of the 
Council of D.C. (Jan. 21, 2005) (on file with Thomas P. Sullivan)). 
 171.  See cases cited supra note 42; see also statutes cited supra note 47. 
 172.  Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 886. 
 173.  See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 190 (2006).  The supreme court has previously 
guided its decision by referring to other jurisdictions’ policies.  See, e.g., State v. 
Conger, 652 N.W.2d 704, 708–09 (Minn. 2002) (observing that no other states 
extend their recording requirements to non-custodial interrogations). 
 174.  See sources cited supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 175.  Zahnd, supra note 164, at 38. 
 176.  Id. at 38.  The proposed legislation was eventually passed without 
amendment on August 28, 2009.  Id. at 40 (codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 590.700 
(Supp. 2010)). 
 177.  See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4507(1) (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-
16(E) (West Supp. 2009). 
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of another state.178  Interestingly, some commentators have 
combined the two approaches and recommend an exception for 
out-of-state interrogations conducted “without involvement of or 
connection to a law enforcement officer of [the forum state].”179  
Regardless of the other jurisdictions’ qualifying provisions, the 
relevant insight to gain from each policy is the necessity to except 
out-of-state interrogations. 
As the number of jurisdictions with recording requirements 
continues to rise,180 it is reasonable to expect that the issue of 
unrecorded, out-of-state interrogations may eventually fade away.  
In the meantime, to avoid placing an undue burden on law 
enforcement and to adhere to the apparent multi-jurisdictional 
support for an exception to the requirement, the supreme court 
should create an exception to Scales for out-of-state custodial 
interrogations. 
2. Averting Potential Exploitation 
As was the case in implementing other exceptions to the 
recording requirement, there are legitimate concerns that arise by 
limiting Scales to interrogations within Minnesota.181  One 
predominating concern is that law enforcement officers could 
exploit the rule by intentionally interrogating suspects outside the 
state of Minnesota.  Indeed, they could potentially utilize this tactic 
in interstate or joint federal-state operations by simply instructing 
the foreign agency to detain and interrogate the suspect in its 
respective jurisdiction before transferring the suspect to Minnesota. 
 
 
 
 
 178.  For example, North Carolina’s statute permits the admission of 
statements made during an interrogation that is conducted by law enforcement 
officers of another state or federal law enforcement officers.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
15A-211(g)(4), (5) (2009); see also D.C. CODE § 5-116.01(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 
2007) (limiting the requirement to members of the Metropolitan Police 
Department); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.073(1)(b), (c), 165.83(1)(b), 165.85(2)(c) 
(West 2007 & Supp. 2009) (limiting the requirement to state officers). 
 179.  Thomas P. Sullivan & Andrew W. Vail, The Consequences of Law Enforcement 
Officials’ Failure to Record Custodial Interviews as Required By Law, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 215, app. A § 3(f) (2009) (proposing a model statute). 
 180.  ABA RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 5. 
 181.  See generally 7 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE 
SERIES: CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 6.14 (3d ed. 2009) (outlining various 
holdings in recording cases). 
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Coincidentally, the supreme court previously addressed a 
practically identical concern when deciding whether to apply Scales 
to non-custodial interrogations in State v. Conger.182  Police are in a 
position to similarly undermine Scales because they ultimately 
determine when to place a suspect in custody.183  However, while 
the court recognized both the potential for police gaming and the 
benefit of applying Scales to all interrogations, it nonetheless 
declined to extend Scales to non-custodial interrogations.184  The 
court primarily based its decision on other states’ policies, the 
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, and academic 
scholars’ recommendations.185 
There is undoubtedly the potential for law enforcement to 
abuse an exception for out-of-state interrogations similar to the 
potential for abuse posed by limiting Scales to custodial 
interrogations.  However, just as no jurisdiction requires recording 
non-custodial interrogations, no other state requires recording out-
of-state interrogations.186  Further, seemingly every academic article 
that advocates for electronic recording also advocates for an 
exception to the rule if the interrogation is conducted outside the 
jurisdiction.187  Under the supreme court’s reasoning in Conger, 
Scales should not extend to interrogations outside Minnesota 
despite the potential for exploitation. 
Aside from the analogous conclusion reached in Conger, there 
is strong evidence to support the conclusion that law enforcement 
agencies would have little to gain by exploiting an out-of-state 
interrogation exception.188  In fact, some argue that law 
 
 182.  652 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Minn. 2002). 
 183.  Conger argued that “there is a serious loophole in Scales because police 
control the decision when to place a person in custody, and they can delay that 
decision to avoid the recording requirement.”  Id. 
 184.  Id.  However, the court warned law enforcement agents not to 
“manipulate the custody status of suspects to avoid the Scales recording 
requirement.”  Id. at 709. 
 185.  Id. at 708.  Specifically, the court noted that “the majority of the 
academic articles advocating a recording requirement limit their endorsement to 
custodial interrogations.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  The court also supported its 
argument with the fact that “no state has extended such a mandate to 
noncustodial situations.”  Id. at 709.  
 186.  See sources cited supra note 47. 
 187.  See, e.g., Sullivan & Vail, supra note 179, at app. A. 
 188.  Indeed, the recording requirement is effective in the first place because 
“[c]ompliance imposes such minimal costs and burdens on law enforcement 
agencies that they will have little to gain from noncompliance.”  Stephan v. State, 
711 P.2d 1156, 1163 (Alaska 1985). 
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enforcement agencies are one of the greatest beneficiaries of a 
recording requirement.189  Recording interrogations improves 
relations between police and the community, decreases allegations 
of police brutality and misconduct, and eliminates “swearing 
matches” between police and suspects over “who said what in the 
interrogation room.”190  Further, both jurors and judges alike find it 
increasingly difficult to believe that recording equipment was not 
readily available to the interrogating officers, so recording actually 
enhances a law enforcement officer’s credibility in trial.191  Finally, 
recording interrogations provides an excellent tool for training 
new officers in proper and effective interrogation techniques.192 
Clearly, law enforcement agencies have more to lose than to 
gain by abusing an exception for interrogations conducted outside 
Minnesota.193  However, to ensure that officers do not abuse the 
exception, the supreme court should narrow the exception’s 
application to custodial interrogations conducted outside 
Minnesota “without the involvement of or connection to a law 
enforcement officer of [Minnesota].”194  This approach is consistent 
with the policy underlying the exclusionary rule in Scales, because 
 
 189.  Thurlow, supra note 161, at 771. 
 190.  Oliver, supra note 18, at 282–83. 
 191.  Recording Federal Interviews, supra note 47, at 1316–21 (providing several 
examples of cases in which the judges and juries have been dissatisfied with federal 
agencies’ failure to record interrogations).  For example, one judge was clearly 
frustrated by the lack of recording when he told a police witness: 
If you’ve got audio and videotape there, I think you ought to use it.  I 
don’t know why I have to sit here and sort through the credibility of what 
was said in these interviews when there’s a perfect device available to 
resolve that and eliminate any discussion about it. 
Everybody Wins, supra note 1, at 1130 (citing Transcript of Motion to Suppress 
Hearing at 72, United States v. Bland, No. 1:02-CR-93 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 13, 2002)); 
see also FBI BULLETIN, supra note 162, at 6 (“By recording, the officer can 
demonstrate commitment to impartiality by collecting and preserving evidence in 
its most unbiased and unadulterated form.”). 
 192.  FBI BULLETIN, supra note 162, at 6. 
 193.  The advantages of recording have caused the reform to gain wide 
support of law enforcement agencies across the country.  Ongoing surveys of law 
enforcement personnel in jurisdictions that record reveal enthusiastic support for 
the practice.  Thomas P. Sullivan, The Time Has Come for Law Enforcement Recordings 
of Custodial Interviews, Start to Finish, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 175, 178 (2006).  In 
fact, some police departments even record interrogations in jurisdictions without 
statewide recording requirements.  See Everybody Wins, supra note 1, at 1136 
(“[M]any police and sheriff departments have voluntarily adopted the practice of 
recording custodial questioning sessions.”). 
 194.  Sullivan & Vail, supra note 179, at app. A § 3(f) (proposing a model 
statute). 
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the burden still falls on Minnesota officials to ensure that the out-
of-state agency complies with the recording requirement or they 
risk losing any evidence obtained.195  At the same time, prosecutions 
in joint federal-state or interstate operations will not be hampered 
by suppression of valuable statements lawfully obtained before 
Minnesota’s involvement in the case.196 
To illustrate, both Sanders and In re The Welfare of C.M.D. 
presented opportunities for Minnesota law enforcement to request 
the foreign agency to record the interrogation.  In Sanders, the 
Chicago FBI office contacted the St. Paul Police Department before 
they interrogated Sanders,197 so the St. Paul Police could have easily 
informed the FBI about Minnesota’s recording requirement.  
Similarly, in In re The Welfare of C.M.D., the St. Paul officer not only 
requested the Abilene officer to interview the defendant, but 
actually faxed Minnesota documents to him, including of “Notice 
of Rights” form.198  If the exception was limited to interrogations 
conducted without the involvement of Minnesota agencies, Scales 
would have applied to both interrogations in these cases, and the 
courts would have more properly proceeded with the second step 
of the analysis determining whether the violation was substantial.199 
It therefore seems that one commentator accurately suggested 
that “the reason[s] so few complications have occurred [with 
recording requirements] are undoubtedly the liberal provisions 
that excuse recordings, and the good faith efforts of law enforcement 
personnel to comply with the recording mandates and to honor suspects’ 
rights.”200  Judging from the increase in legislation that includes an 
 
 195.  See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 196.  Cf. Memorandum from the Office of Gen. Counsel, FBI, to Field Offices 
& Headquarter Divs. (Mar. 23, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com
/packages/pdf/national/20070402_FBI_Memo.pdf (noting that restrictive state 
law policies requiring recordation have precluded the FBI from using unrecorded 
FBI interrogations in cases that ultimately result in state prosecution). 
 197.  See State v. Sanders, 743 N.W.2d 616, 618 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d 775 
N.W.2d 883 (Minn. 2009). 
 198.  No. A09-825, 2010 WL 607090, *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2010).  
 199.  Cf. cases cited supra note 39 and accompanying text.  Any questions 
regarding the level of law enforcement involvement required to trigger the 
application of Scales are sufficiently resolved by the Model Code factors in the 
“substantial” test.  The note to Model Code § 150.3 explains that if a court finds 
that an “agency has not taken reasonably adequate steps in good faith to assure 
compliance . . . , it should give special credence to the account of the defendant.”  
State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 893 (Minn. 2009) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.3 (1975)). 
 200.  Recording Federal Interviews, supra note 47, at 1328–29 (emphasis added). 
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exception for interrogations conducted outside the jurisdiction, a 
consensus is developing that such an exception is an important and 
beneficial facet of a recording requirement.201  Further, the 
potential concern that officers will abuse the exception is effectively 
refuted by the many benefits recording confers on law 
enforcement, and the ensuing disincentive for noncompliance.  
Finally, the court could preempt police gaming by narrowing the 
exception to interrogations conducted outside Minnesota without 
the involvement of Minnesota law enforcement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Sanders showcases why Minnesota’s lack of “detailed provisions 
for unforeseen circumstances and inevitable glitches” has been 
criticized.202  Unlike inherently comprehensive statutes, Scales 
provides little guidance for law enforcement and courts alike, and 
necessitates that courts actively develop the requirement.  
Consequently, it is imperative that courts squarely address issues of 
first impression regarding the recording requirement to ensure its 
efficient implementation. 
Accordingly, in Sanders, the Minnesota Supreme Court should 
have examined whether Scales applies to interrogations conducted 
outside Minnesota.  Further, based on the requirement’s authority 
as an act of supervisory power and practical policy considerations, 
the court should have established that the recording requirement 
does not apply to out-of-state interrogations.  Although the 
recording requirement has had positive effects in Minnesota,203 the 
court should continue to recognize the necessity for exceptions to 
maintain the effective administration of law enforcement, and 
adopt an exception for interrogations conducted outside 
Minnesota without the involvement of Minnesota law enforcement.  
While Mr. Harris was accurate in his assertion that the recording 
requirement was the best thing for the criminal justice system in 
Minnesota, the issue in Sanders exemplifies the proposition that 
there can be too much of a good thing. 
 
 
 201.  See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
 202.  Everybody Wins, supra note 1, at 1137. 
 203.  Aside from protecting defendants’ rights, Scales has reduced the number 
of law enforcement issues brought to the courts, eliminated frivolous and 
unfounded objections by defendants, and provided the best evidence for 
prosecution.  Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 890 (Anderson, J., concurring). 
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